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NOTES AND COMMENT

request to the Board of Directors, and failing this, he must request
the Superintendent of Insurance to intervene. Then if the provisions of Article 6 of the General Corporation Law apply to him, he
must supply security for expenses, if he does not hold five per cent
of the outstanding policies or if his interest does not exceed fifty
thousand dollars. Therefore, if the right of a policyholder to bring
a derivative action exists, it is so limited that it is of little practical
value under the present state of our law.
ANDREw L. HUGHES.

THE EMPLOYER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Equality of opportunity and freedom of action are inherent
rights of individuals under any socio-economic system such as our
own democracy. Unlimited freedom of action permitted to one group,
however, will inevitably infringe upon the goal of equality of opportunity, toward which all strive. The reason for this is apparent: just
as the law of physics states, as a fundamental precept, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction, so we find in economics that
in any given field where two or more persons have their individual
interests, the actions of one taken in his own behalf, will prove correspondingly detrimental to the others. The struggle between labor
and management gives perhaps the greatest example of the conflict.
The relationship of employer and employee necessarily results
in the economic dominance of the employer over the employee, and
this in turn leads to the imposition, to at least some extent, of the
will of the employer upon that of the employee. In the words of the
National Labor Relations Board: "In the normal relationship between employer and employee, almost any expression of opinion by
the employer indicating to those who depend upon his continued good
will for their livelihood an unequivocal disapproval of their forming
or joining a labor organization characteristically carries home to employees an implied threat of unlawful discrimination for noncompliance with the employer's desires."' We find here, therefore,
an instance wherein we are compelled in the interest of society to restrict the freedom of activity of one group, the employers, so that
another group, the employees, may achieve the desired goal of equality
of opportunity. But what is the nature of this restriction, and what
limitation is placed upon it by the Constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech? 2
1 Southern Colorado Power Co., 13 N. L. IL B. 699 (1939).
2U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. I. Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
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I
Ushering in the era of modern labor legislation, the National
Labor Relations Act 8 became law on July 5, 1935, thus becoming
the first attempt by the Federal Government to bring about equality
of bargaining power between employer and employee. In no section
of the Wagner Act is specific mention made of the right of free
speech, or the restriction thereof. Expressly condemned by the Act,
however, is any effort by the employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by the
Act. 4 As stated in the Act: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 5
Following the establishment of the constitutionality of the Act,6
and in order to fulfill its intent and purposes, it became manifestly
necessary for judicial interpretation to allow the imposition of restrictions upon the employer's right of self-expression. Fully considering the mandate of the Constitution, the courts were naturally
reluctant to abridge free speech in any way. Conceding the right of
workers to organize to be a natural right of equal rank with the great
right of free speech, an extremely practical solution to the problem
was found. Granted that the employer has every right to express
himself as he sees fit. But certainly the constitutional guaranty of
free speech does not extend to him unlimited license to violate the
rights of others. Thus, where by coercion, threats, or intimidation
the employer imposes his will upon another, to restrict these actions
cannot be called an abridgment of a constitutional right. It follows,
therefore, that an employer may express his opinion on any topic he
may choose, whether involving labor unions or not, so long as his
expressions do not in any way contribute to, or constitute acts or
threats of discrimination, coercion or intimidation, in denial of the
exercise of those rights guaranteed him by the
employee's free
7
Wagner Act.

To effectuate the policies of the Act the National Labor Relations Board was created. In accordance with established principles
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
849 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§151-166 (1940).
449 STAT., 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940). It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.
549 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1940).
6 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893
(1937).
7Jefferson Electric Co. v. N. L. R. B., 102 F. 2d 949 (C. C. A. 7th 1939);
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. 2d 922 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
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of administrative law, the N. L. R. B. is considered a body possessing
judicial functions and powers, and so having authority to decide questions of fact upon the evidence, and to make findings which, if found
are conclusive upon the reto be supported
8 by substantial evidence,
viewing court.
Coercion of the employee having been made an unfair labor practice by the Act, the Board's immediate task was to arrive at a workable norm for the determination of the existence of coercion. The
policy adopted is aptly expressed in the Board's own words: "In
many instances, the coercive element is inherent in the statement itself or may be readily inferred from the context in which it is made.
Typical of this class of statements which are per se violative of Section 8(1) are those containing actual, implied, or veiled threats of
economic reprisal. Equally violative of the Act are those statements
which bespeak a determination not to bargain collectively with a
labor organization even if it should attain majority status. Other
statements, which on their face appear to be unobjectionable, nevertheless may be coercive, and therefore a violation of the Act, when
viewed in the light of other unfair labor practices committed by the
employer. This is so where the statement is an inseparable and integral part of a course of conduct which in its 'totality' amounts to
coercion within the meaning of the Act." 9
A comprehensive study of decisions results in several broad
classifications into which any given set of facts may be placed. The
determination of the question of whether or not a statement is violative of Section 8(1) can therefore be made through the process
of placing the facts of the particular case into the proper category.
The first and most obvious category is that which includes statewhich by their very wording coerce the
ments of the employer
employee (i.e., are coercive per se). Typical of this group are the
following:
Where supervisor told employees "I've heard quite a bit about
your talking Union around here.... You keep your nose clear
or out you go";" x or, "I want you fellows to realize there is
some Union talk going on around here and if it is not stopped
somebody is going to lose their job"; 12 or, where manager asked
8Jacksonville Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 137 F. 2d 148 (C. C. A. 5th 1943);
Continental
Box Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. 2d 93 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
9
10

N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 86 L. ed. 348 (1941).
In N. L. R. B. v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. 2d 371 (C. C. A.

8th 1944), it was held that the term 'employer" signifies both the employer
himself and those acting in a supervisory capacity while in his employ. "The
test of corporate responsibility for the acts of its officers and agents is whether
the agent in doing the thing complained of was engaged in employing the corporate powers actually authorized for the benefit of the corporation while acting

within the scope of his employment."
'IN. L. R. B. v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. 2d 371 (C. C. A.
8th 1944).
Ibid.
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those employees to resign who had refused to withdraw their
applications, because of their union membership; 13 or, where
manager told employee "As far as the Union is concerned...
we can find enough on practically any man in the office to get
rid of him"; 14 or, where the president learned that in one department only the supervisory employees would sign an antiunion pledge, he commented: "The first thing to do would be
to get rid of them"--referring to the non-signers who were discharged the next day; 15 or, where plant superintendent said
that if employees struck, they would be through at petitioner's
place forever, and where plant manager told union foreman that
if he wanted to join the union, to go ahead and join, but to
"get the hell out of" petitioner's shop.10
With the above examples as guideposts, any objective analyst
can readily identify statements which are coercive per se.
Greater complications arise, however, when statements are encountered which are not overtly coercive. A threat, no matter how
veiled, remains a threat though the coercive element may only be implied therefrom and is nowhere expressed therein. In this classification fall the following situations:
Manager having authority over employees' jobs and wages stated
to his men that if they join-the union they are "sticking their
necks out," and where he directed them to return from the union
meeting with a "changed mind." 17
Where supervisors told employees: "You will find if unions get
in it will be worse than it is," and that the employer "could not
pay any more, they were paying as much as they could already
and would have to close the doors," and that "if the union gets
in here we will all be walking the streets." Is
Foreman told employees: "I hear you fellows are going to tell
about me up there (before the Board hearing). You hadn't
better or it's going to be too bad." 19
Company President said to an employee: "I don't want that
damned union. I would sooner have my own union. I would
23 N. L. R. B. v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 140 F. 2d 404 (C. C. A.
5th 1944).
14 N.L. R. B. v. Monumental Life Insurance Co., 12 CCH LAB. LAW SEav.
§63,800 (C. C. A. 6th 1947).
'I N. L. R. B. v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F. 2d 664 (C.C. A. 7th 1947).
10 R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. N. L. R. B., 156 F. 2d 416 (C. C. A. 7th
1946).
17 N. L. P. B. v. Peterson, 157 F. 2d 514 (C. C. A. 6th 1946).
IsN. L. R. B. v. Kopman-Woracek Shoe Mfg. Co., 158 F. 2d 103 (C. C. A.
8th 1946).
10 Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. 2d 371 (C. C. A. 8th
1944).
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sooner have my own money in my own pocket." Assistant
Superintendent said, referring to previous abortive attempt to
organize: "You know what happened the other time. The
thing was ironed out and a lot of fellows lost their jobs and were
left holding the bag. The same thing might happen this time."
Also in speaking to an employee who had previously voted for
the union, he said that the employee "should be careful how he
voted, otherwise he would be on the outside looking in again." 2 0
Foreman told employees: "If they don't stop bringing in the
union, we will have a lot more machines in." A letter was also
written to employees during a strike mentioning that: "It would
be futile to resume operations except under conditions that will
make impossible a repetition of Monday's walkout or any other
suspension of operations." 21
There are some statements which neither express nor imply coercion, but which, when considered in the light of all surrounding
facts and circumstances, constitute a direct violation of Section 8(1).
In the words of the court in the leading case of N. L. R. B. v. Virginia
Power Co.,22 "Certainly conduct, though evidenced in part by speech,
may amount in connection with other circumstances to coercion within the meaning of the Act. If the total activities of the employer restrain or coerce his employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled to the protection of the Act. And in determining
whether a course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure
exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted other ways." Typical of the cases in this category
are:
Company had long history of hostility to unions, including the
employment of labor spies. In a bulletin the company told its
employees to deal directly with them and not through an "outside" union. An employee who protested against forming an
"independent" union was discharged, as was one who belonged
to an "outside" union and who refused to join the independent.23
After employees joined union, company foreman went around
with union-resignation blanks for them to sign. An employee
testified that he was given to understand that "if I did not sign
it, I might as well look for another job." One employee asked
by a company official to sign a resignation from the union refused and was forced to resign. A company official refused to
help union members, who explained: "since we were still members of the union ... he couldn't possibly help us in so far as
20

N. L. R B. v. Pick Mfg. Co., 135 F. 2d 329 (C. C. A. 7th 1943).

21 N. L. R. B. v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 147 F. 2d 262 (C. C. A. 6th

1945).

U. S. 469, 86 L. ed. 348 (1941).
Ibid.

22314
23
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he would be going against the policy of the company which he

led." 24
Respondent had a past record of violent anti-labor acts. Respon-

dent had been ordered by the N. L. R. B. to cease and desist
from certain unfair labor practices and to post a notice in the
usual form.25 Coincidental with the posting of the Board's notice, the employer posted his own notice, referring to the "past
happy relationship of mutual confidence and understanding with
each other," and which also stated that "there is no law which
requires, or is intended to compel, you to pay dues to any
organization." Several weeks later, a second notice was posted,
stating: "It has come to our attention that a group of our employees have met to form an organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and we wish to repeat that it is not necessary for any employee to join any organization or to pay dues
to any organization in order to continue in our employ." 26
General manager told employees that the union officials were a
bunch of shysters who were not "out to help" the employees and
who could do them no good. He warned the employees that the
union would "stuff this place full of cutters and keep you fellows
from getting all the work you should," and that he would "never
sign a union contract" and that he would "sooner close up this
place than operate under a bunch of shysters." These statements were coupled with such anti-union history as continuous
opposition and resistance to collective bargaining, and where this
unlawful refusal to bargain collectively caused a strike, which
the company prolonged by failure to reinstate the strikers upon
the union's demand,
thus violating employee's rights under Sec27
tion 7 of the Act.
At this point it may seem that the constitutional guarantee of
free speech afforded little protection to the employer under the Wagner Act. But a search into case history shows that this is not so, in
as much as the employer is protected to the fullest extent as to any
matters upon which he wishes to express an opinion, so long as his
expressions do not constitute coercion. Statements which were
neutral expressions of fact or opinion, or which were informative or
appeals to reason, comprise the fiist classification of permissible
speech by the employer. Examples of this are:
2254 N. L.

R. B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 7th 1940).
To the effect that "respondent would not engage in the conduct from
which it was ordered to desist, that it would take the affirmative action required by the order, that its employees were free to become or remain members
of the union, and that it would not discriminate against any employee because

of membership in, or activity on behalf of, the union."
2BN. L. R. B. v. M. E. Biatt Co., 143 F. Zd 268 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
27N L. R. B. v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).

1947 ]

NOTES AND COMMENT

The Board ordered the company to cease supporting a company
dominated union and to post notices of its intention to comply
with the order. Concurrently with the posting of the notices
the company sent a letter to each employee, seeking to impress
them with the fact that they were free to form a union of their
own or to join an outside union. The letter emphasized the advantages of the "inside" union, and stated the belief that the
Board's order to the company to withdraw support from that
union w-as wrong,
unfair, and contrary to the best interests of
28
the employees.
Letters and speeches by the employer made on the eve of a bargaining election stated that unionism would be against the employees' best interests; also argued was that the future prosperity
of the company depended upon continuing operations as theretofore. The statement further said that the company would
abide by the results of the election, though it preferred no union,
and that 29
there would be no reprisals against those thinking
otherwise.
Respondent distributed literature disparaging and criticizing the
union, but containing no threat of discharge. Statements such
as the following were made: "Figure it out for yourself. If
you go into a union, they have got you, but what have you got?"
. .. "If the union leaders are sincere, they should go into the
business themselves." . . . "A little group of those who control
both capital and labor will sit down in New York and settle
prices, dividends, and wages." . .. "I have never sought to prevent our men from joining any association .... No one who
believes in American freedom would do that." 8 0
Employer stated that employees would gain nothing from joining the union. He further characterized the union as having
been organized by racketeers.3 1
Other situations in which an employer may speak freely without
violating Section 8(1) exist when he replies to the union's derogatory statements or to the union's statements misrepresenting the issues
in controversy. It must be remembered, however, that the employer
cannot take the offensive. Illustrating this category we have the
following cases:
Union publication accused respondent and its officials of being
unpatriotic, of fascism, of exploiting children, of maintaining
28
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. 2d 922 (C. C. A. 3d
1944).
2
9N. L. R.B. v. American Tube Bend. Co., 134 F. 2d 993 (C. C. A. 2d
1943).
so N.L. P. B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. 2d 905 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
31 Jacksonville Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 137 F. Zd 148 (C. C. A. 5th
1943).
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rotten working conditions, and of using misguided employees for
foul purposes, etc. The company retaliated by publishing statements denouncing the accusations, and accusing the union of
defamation, and stating that suits for damages because of the
libel have been commenced against the union. The court said:
"The company is not required to stand mute in the face of Union
attacks and has a right to defend its reputation and prove itself
worthy of loyalty before its employees." 32
Union attacked respondent for its "un-American" attitude; accused a company officer of having "slashed" a contract and of
having "garbled" it to suit his own selfish desires; charged that
the company paid a "low starvation wage," and that respondent
continued to "rob the employees of their lunch and rest periods,"
etc. Respondent counterattacked, charging the union with
adopting Hitlerian tactics in their tirades against the company.
Many statements were made by the company and by the officers,
generally in the nature of refutation of the union charges. The
court upheld the right of the company to answer charges made
against it.3
Respondent posted bulletins containing true statements of facts
as to wages earned by the employees, and as to seniority arrangements. The bulletins also gave the company's view of events
at the plants which had been described in unfavorable terms by
the union on its radio broadcasts and in its publications. The
company said the following with regard to union charges:
THE LIE--"We charge F. C. Crawford, president of Thompson products, as being un-American, subversive, pro-axis, and an enemy of our
country."

THE TRUTH-This is a blackguard statement, arousing the resentment
of employees, civic, educational and charitable leaders and high government officials who have first hand knowledge of Mr. Crawford's beliefs

and achievements.
THE LIE--"The company . . . also indulges in the lowly chiseling
thievery of short-changing your pay."

THE TRUTH-This scurrilous remark is a reflection on the honesty
and character of each and every one of the hundreds of counters, timekeepers, and payroll clerks who make out the pay as well as the company.

The right of3the
company to publish these-responses was upheld
4
by the court.

32

1946).

N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 8th

N. L. R. B. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (C. C. A. 8th 1944).
N.L. R. B. v. Thompson Products, Inc., 12 CCH LAB. LAW SERV. § 63,906
(C. C. A. 6th 1947).
33
34
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II
Coercion of the employee by the employer remains forbidden by

the terms of the most recent national labor legislation, the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947.35 Section 8(c) 36 expressly protects the rights of the employer, however, to speak freely so long as
his words in no way threaten reprisal. This provision should prove
to be a codification rather than a change in the law as administered
by the Board and by the courts prior to the passage of this legislation.
The year 1947, unlike 1935 at the enactment of the Wagner Act,
finds labor on virtually an even plane with management in many sections of the country. Certainly this equality of status, along with the
acceptance of unionism and the education of the worker, mean that
the employee will not so easily be hampered in the free exercise of
his own will by equivocal words or conduct on the ,part of the employer. Such conduct, which at one time would have been deemed
coercive, might be considered today as mere forceful expressions of
opinion, protected by the Constitution and by the express terms of
the Taft-Hartley Act. As expressed by the court in N. L. R. B. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co.: " "The First Amendment is intended
to assure a privilege'that in itself must be so actual and certain that
fear and doubt are absent from the individual mind, or the freedom
is but an abstraction. If the employer must hesitate before uttering
his thoughts, if he must weigh and nicely balance every word so as
to determine whether what he is about to say is permitted or forbidden, the guaranty tendered by the Constitution is little more than
theoretical. He is 'wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding
of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn
as to his intent and meaning. Such a distinction offers no security
for free discussion.'" These words seem to typify the mature outlook adopted by the courts during the past year or so to meet the
changing conditions in the field of labor-management relations. It
would not be rash to predict that many cases whose facts fall closely
within the second and third categories (coercion by implication and
coercion by "totality" of conduct) as enumerated in this note, would
be found to be free of coercion if decided today. Certainly we can
safely say today that the employer can express his hostility to a union
with impunity, and in all probability his opinion of the union leaders
may also he expressed. He has the right to inquire into the progress
of the unions in their organizing activities, and he has the right to
8549 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166 (1940), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947).
3r Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., ist Sess., §8(c) (June 23, 1947). "The
expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if
such3 expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
7 N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 8th

1946).
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disparage the union so long as his words do not imply a threat of
retaliation. He may express his opinion as to the benefits or lack of
benefits to be obtained by the employees if they unionize, and he can
probably make it known that he thinks that unionization might cause
him to close down because of the increased costs, and that it might
result in the adoption of a system of seniority, causing the discharge
of new employees. In short, there is practically no limitation upon
the topics upon which the employer may speak or write, so long as
his expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit. All this presupposes, of course, that the employer's attitude
and tone of voice while uttering these otherwise innocuous expressions, are not such as ii themselves to be coercive.
Under no circumstances, however, can we forget that in many
parts of the country the unions have made no deep inroads even
today, and so the employer remains omnipotent so far as his employees are concerned. In such areas conditions are substantially
those which caused the enactment of the Wagner Act, and which
caused the Board to apply the term "coercion" rather freely. Wherever this is the case, the realization is unavoidable that the Board
and the courts must remain ever alert to catch those subtle expressions of the employer which, by their tone or wording, imply that
the employee had better be receptive, or else!
PAUL L. HERZOG,
HOwAmI) A. RIKOON.

LiAILITY OF OCCUPIER OF LAND TO UNDISCOVERED
TRESPAssER

One has often heard the saying that a man's home is his castle.
In not many other fields of the law is this adage more vividly illustrated than in the field of the law of negligence wherein it appears
that an occupier of land is not liable for injury to an undiscovered
trespasser.
It is a settled rule of law, that, generally speaking, an occupier
of land is not subject to liability for an injury to atrespasser of whose
presence the occupier was unaware.1 By entering upon the property
of another without being invited to do so, the trespasser violates the
right of the possessor of the land to exclusive possession and control.
1 Prondecka v. Turner Falls Power & E. Co., 241 Mass. 100, 134 N. E.
352 (1922); Weitzmann v. Barber Asphalt Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477
(1908); Panunzio v. State, 266 App. Div. 9, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (3d Dep't
1943).

